Ortak ticaret politikasında AB kurumlarının rolü: AB-Kanada kapsamlı ekonomi ve ticaret anlaşması üzerine bir değerlendirme

This dissertation examines the roles of the European Commission, Council of the European Union and European Parliament in common trade policy. By combining principal-agent approach with political economy, it aims to answer two main questions: Is Commission's autonomy restricted by any of other two European Union (EU) institutions in negotiation, signature and ratification process of a new generation trade agreement between the EU and a third country? Do the priorities of three institutions regarding trade policy diverge from each other? In this respect, to be able to analyze the institutions' positions and their impact on a policy outcome, EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is examined. First, the study uses data gathered from international, European and national media as well as the official documents of the EU, Canada and member states to present conflictual dynamics of inter-institutional relations in the field of EU trade. Second, it employs content analysis to analyze official documents published by Commission, Council and Parliament regarding CETA and also the main text of agreement. Negotiation subjects are categorized as values and economic interests. The findings reveal that both Council/member states and Parliament managed to limit Commission's autonomy and to affect the final agreement. It was also found that, independent from political-economic orientation, each institution was successful in reflecting its own priorities on CETA. Moreover, institutions' priorities do not diverge significantly from each other. Thus, Commission, Council and Parliament play complementary roles by supporting EU's neoliberal economic orientation in implementation of its inter-regional trade policy.