Russia's Islamic policy in Putin era: Comporative analysis ofChechnya and Tatarstan examples

This thesis examines Russia's Islamic policy in the period of Vladimir Putin through the examples of Chechnya and Tatarstan within the framework of the Copenhagen School's approach to securitization. Although their ethnic origins are different, Islam functions both as the umbrella identity of the approximately 20 million Muslims in Russia and as a means of political and social protest. This power of Islam is naturally used by both the political power and the opposition. The main argument of the thesis is that Putin's administration follows a utilitarian policy that includes authoritarian and flexible approaches towards Muslims and that Islam is instrumentalized for political purposes. With Putin's coming to power in Russia, the Islamist terrorist threat was placed at the center of the securitization discourse, and the boundaries of the political and artificial distinction between "traditional Russian Islam" and "non-traditional Islam" were clearly defined. In the thesis, it is argued that Russia's Islamic policy is shaped based on this distinction. While non-traditional Islam is seen as a threat to the security of the state and political power and is securitized, the understanding of Islam, defined as traditional Russian Islam, is desecuritized and accepted by the state. Similar distinctions and approaches apply to the examples of Chechnya and Tatarstan, and the Kazan and Grozny governments, like Moscow, instrumentalize Islam. The different manifestations and roles of Islam, which has been instrumentalized in a wide range from functioning as the main ideology that provides the legitimacy of the current political powers in Russia to national identity and assimilation, are discussed in the axis of religion, state and politics. Key Words: Russia, Islam, Chechnya, Tatartstan, Putin, Securitization