Reason understanding critics in Soren Kierkegaard's Hegel system

II SUMMARY When we look at the history of thought we see that the views of certain philosophers transcend the their age and become the source for the coming cen turies. Hegel and Kierkegaard had such influences over the philosophers coming after them and through their works, they had shed light on the development of the critical thought. In this work, we discuss the last system philosopher, Hegel's explanation of the whole universe and reality through the concept of the realization of dialectical reason and in contrast to this we discuss Kierkegaard's consideration of reality on the basis of concrete individual through an existentialist view and this individual's becoming mature by the way of qualitative developments. Primarily we explained Hegel's conception of reason; he connects reason with history, aesthetic, ethic and religion and insists that it continuously passes through dialectical stages and reaches at the Absolute. Hegel considers dialectic as the ground of philosophy and sees it as a method. For him dialectic reconciles everything and transcends all conflicts through synthesis. Reason revealing in a dialectical form can constitute a system philosophy since it is identical both in thought and in being. Then we tried to systematize Kierkegaard's conception of reason by virtue of his peculiar, existentialist philosophy. Here we investigated the distinctiveness of each moment of existence and we investigated what it takes in contriteness, in sub jectivity by the titles of dialectic, reason, aesthetic, ethic, and religion. After presenting the views of each philosopher, we attempt to compare their ideas. In this thesis, we considered Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel who hides the reality of concrete individual, sometimes through a dialectical sometimes through an ironical way, based on an abstract reason. We saw that Kierkegaard criticizing Hegel's speculative explanation gives a truth to concrete individual. The main problematic in this critic, for us, is not to reach at new notions and knowledge through dialectic; but to deny being a part of the system and the free life of indi vidual in the theological domain. Lastly, as a main aspect of our problem, we emphasized that for Kierkegaard, concrete and subjective individual deny being a stage of system philosophy and that individual existence is more significant then an abstract reason.