Impacts of deposit insurance and other variables on bank risk-taking incentives

The schemes of deposit insurance were initiated in 1930 in reaction to the influence of the Great Depression on banking systems. It is inevitable that many bank customers and financial institutions will be worried about the bank's solvency when banks fail by taking risks or in an economic depression. In this environment of anxiety depositors impetuously withdraw their deposits and this is called 'bank run'. The existence of deposit insurance practices prevents the banking sector from the risk of failing to meet its obligations and thus plays an important role in maintaining the safety of this sector. Besides the deposit insurance system protecting depositors, it has contributed to taking the excessive and unnecessary risk of banks. The system of deposit insurance has several advantages for both banks and depositors. Academic discussions widely concentrate on whether the system of deposit insurance is an origin of moral hazard or not. This reduces the courage of depositors to monitor banks, on the other hand, banks know that their deposits are protected by the insurance system and this encourages banks to take excessive risks. The aim of this study is to explain the possibility of deposit insurance implementations turning into a possible moral hazard problem through the risk taking behavior of banks.