Yükselen piyasalardaki pazar disiplini üzerine makaleler

In the aftermath of major crises, most emerging markets improvedtheir banking industries according to Basel-II requirements, whichemphasize the role of market discipline, supervision and capitaladequacy in controlling risk-taking by banks. After the 1998 crisisin the Russian Federation and the 2001 crisis in Turkey, CentralBank of Russia and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency ofTurkey restructured and consolidated the banking industries in bothof the countries. In the restructured banking environment, marketdiscipline could be used as a complementary mechanism for improvedsupervision of banking systems. First two essays of this thesiselaborate on depositor discipline in the Russian Federation andTurkey. Findings provide evidence that in the Russian Federation,depositors allocate funds in well-capitalized and liquid banks.Similarly after the crisis, depositors in Turkey preferwell-capitalized banks that have favorable asset quality. Althoughbanks in Turkey operate more efficiently, due to excessiveguarantees, depositors do not monitor banks' risk taking behaviorparticularly before restructuring. In the third essay, the role ofdifferent types of shareholders in disciplining listed banks inTurkey is studied. While diversified shareholders are interested inprofitability, owner-managers are concerned with capital adequacy,liquidity and efficiency of the banks. In addition, owner-managersare found to have some influence on bank management to reducerisk-taking. In particular, small banks take measures to increasethe capital ratio while decreasing non-performing loans as a resultof an increase in shareholders' asset risk assessments.