Theses supervised by Prof. Dr. Zeynep Direk
15 theses · Koç University, Galatasaray University
Harm to the environment and non-human animals: Can care ethics re-think AI?
The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into various domains raises ethical concerns about its impact on environmental sustainability and animal welfare. Recent studies highlight AI systems, programmed to prioritize profit-making, can exacerbate ecological harm and animal wellbeing. Therefore, this thesis aims to argue for potential ways to approach the anthropocentric tendencies of the development of AI's decision-making from an ethical standpoint. I explore how feminist care ethics, emphasizing interdependence, context, and vulnerability, can provide an ethical framework for AI design that mitigates harm rather than reinforcing anthropocentric biases. Building on Gruen's (2015) concept of entangled empathy, I argue that humans are already in an entangled relationship with non-humans and AI should also be understood as part of relational networks that include animals and the environment. Broadening care ethics to include AI raises the question whether AI can care as humans. Building on the social-relational approach for moral status proposed by Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel, this thesis argues that moral agency as well as ability to care and empathy need not rely on ontological properties but should be grounded in appearance of AI within relational contexts. Through this lens, AI systems may ethically engage with the world not because of what they are, but because of how they interact, respond to needs, form social bonds, and participate in practices of care. This thesis aims to argue that integrating care ethics into AI design fosters a more just and ecologically responsible approach, encouraging interdisciplinary dialogue on the ethical interactions across diverse entities.
Martin Heidegger ve Gilles Deleuze'de hayvan sorusu
The 1929/30 lecture notes of Heidegger open a different path in the definition of fundamental ontology than Being and Time. It is not a coincidence that this text which is one of the precursors of the turn in Heidegger's thought, takes the animal question to the centre of philosophy. In this work, we intended to interrogate in a comparative manner, the ontological elaboration of the animal question of this text and the significance of this elaboration for the thought of Deleuze. In this objective, the texts of Heidegger between 1919 and 1931, together with all the works of Deleuze are treated in our research in a perspective centralising the animal question and in the light of the theory of Jacob von Uexküll, a biologist treated attentively by both philosophers: the link between a possible analytics of Mitsein and "becoming-animal".
Hegel ve Heidegger felsefesinde dünyanın tarihselliği
Though, in our time, we readily speak of the world as distinct from nature, we are nevertheless tempted to believe that the "world" in which we engage is the immediate nature consisting of inanimate objects. However, we are also tempted to defend the idea that the world is historical and cultural. In our study, we will analyze the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions of the historicity of the world. Two main questions will guide our study: 1. How should we approach the difference between what is always already there (nature) and the world? 2. And to what extent does the subject (or Spirit or Dasein) have the power to shape and constitute the world? From these questions, our study tries to explain what the historicity of the world is in Hegel and Heidegger and then to compare their conception of the historicity of the world.
Hegel'de sembolik form ve sembolik ağ sorunu
The subject of this thesis is the Symbolic Form as one of the particular art forms in Hegelian aesthetics. Senses which are taken as contents for artworks in the symbolic form are general and obscure ideas that are separate abstractions intermingled with natural life; and since they cannot be ideally collected together by consciousness, they are devoid of totality. Hegel, in positioning the symbolic form and the civilizations related to that form in accordance with the teleological structure of the internal development of art, claims that the thoughts and ideas taken as the senses of artworks produced according to the fundamental characteristic of the symbolic form are abstract and indeterminate, and that they constitute a multiplicity without unity by. Against Hegelian thought, "meaning", "definition", "abstraction – concreteness" and "determinateness – indeterminateness" have references in a particular network, and these references change and vary according to different symbolic networks. Consequently, the civilizations that Hegel treats in the symbolic form, produce artworks to understand and explain the reason and the unity of the multiplicity in natural and spiritual processes, but they are not the symbolic expressions of an ultimate yet-to-be-determined meaning.
Hegel ve Levinas'ta mutlak ve varlık
This thesis aims to discuss the concepts of the Absolute and Being and their relationship in Hegel and Levinas. The Absolute and the Being and their relationship are thought, at the same time, from the concepts of the Infinite and the Finite. In the first chapter, the concepts and their relation are elaborated within the framework of Hegel's philosophy. In the second chapter, the same discussion is made within the framework of Levinas' philosophy. In the third chapter, this study tries to make a comparison between Hegel and Levinas. In this comparison, it elaborates and criticizes Hegel and Levinas at once, relaying on the idea of duality.
Adorno ve Levinas: Holokost sonrası felsefede etik
This dissertation intends to bring Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor W. Adorno in proximity as the main thinkers of a post-Holocaust philosophy. The motivation of this project is to provide a framework for a post-Holocaust philosophy by way of emphasizing the similarities that are found in the ways in which both of these thinkers respond to the Holocaust, which they both address as an urgent philosophical problem, and not merely a historical catastrophe or a political perversion. Although these thinkers follow very different paths in their philosophical careers, the purpose of this project is to establish a ground of conversation between these two thinkers. The ground on which they would stand side-by-side and shed light upon each other's work is undoubtedly the Holocaust. They both consider the Holocaust to be the ultimate challenge to the Western philosophical tradition which unmasks the violence inherent in the fundamental concepts and theories that are basic constituents of the tradition. Both of these thinkers are engaged in a post-Holocaust philosophy precisely because they are determined to lay bare the self-critique of Western philosophy in which it acknowledges the sad truth that its own conceptual tools, categories, terminological language and mechanisms of generalization and abstraction are indeed susceptible to committing extreme violence and destruction. Both Levinas and Adorno argue that violence caused by indifference that silences or justifies suffering is the central problem that lies at the root of the Western tradition that is revealed by a post-Holocaust philosophy whose purpose of existence is to challenge the very same tradition from within. In this dissertation, our aim is to provide a more precise context for this post-Holocaust philosophy by reading these two claims into each other: the first one is from Adorno, "to lend a voice to suffering is a condition for all truth," and the other is from Levinas, "justification of the neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality." By keeping these two claims in proximity to each other, the similarities and the differences between Adorno's negative dialectics that resist against identity thinking and Levinas' ethics as first philosophy that resist against totalization will be discussed. However, the majority of the dissertation is devoted to Levinas, and Adorno is introduced at the final stage of the project. That is because, we believe that although Adorno's negative dialectics is an indispensable element in outlining a post-Holocaust philosophy, it remains unable to fully lay out the significance of morality by focusing its ethical task on its commitment to the self-critique of reason, thus becoming a never-ending questioning of the ethics of thinking. It should still be acknowledged as a tremendous effort to push philosophy to its limits, however as such Adorno's negative dialectics is at the verge of remaining an immobilized but ever deepening interrogation of the mechanism of thought. Nonetheless, Levinas with his view of ethics as first philosophy comes as a perfect counterpart that motivates and animates Adorno's critique precisely because Levinas takes up the question of subjectivity to understand the structure of ethical relation. Levinas' response to the Holocaust, then, is an urgent call to responding to the others, and thus to a rethinking of a new subjectivity. The ethical subjectivity shatters indifference, interrupts egoism by calling into question its spontaneous unjustified freedom; thus, the ethical subject is for-the-other. Levinas' duty for his readers of a post-Holocaust world is to remind them of the powerful response that uncovers the pre-cognitive, pre-reflective, sensible and sensitive ethical consciousness: "here I am." The project undertaken in this dissertation, then, is to give an account of how Levinas responds to the Holocaust by way of rethinking of the ethical subjectivity as responsibility and substitution.
Kant ve Levinas'ta öz-bilincin insan öznelliğindeki rolü
If Kant is a philosopher commonly known to be "the inventor of subjectivity", Levinas is the one who reinvents it as concrete subjectivity starting from the Other. Even though two centuries separate the two thinkers, we can see that Kant and Levinas play the same role on the stage of the history of thought: that of a defender of subjectivity. However, we do not lose sight of the fact that the subject of which Kant speaks in the Critique de la raison pure is a gnoseological subject, while that of Levinas is defined rather as a responsible subject. Despite this fairly important point of divergence between these two philosophers, the common insistence on subjectivity allows us to establish a link between their philosophical projects. Two questions will serve as guidelines: 1. Can Levinas's understanding of subjectivity be inspired by that of Kant?; 2. Can a Levinassian reading of Kant offer a solution to the impasses of the knowing subject in Kant which originate in the nature of transcendental apperception? To answer these questions, we consider the theory of knowledge as a device insofar as it allows us to show that, without a new epistemology, a new relationship with things and the world, it is not possible to imagine a concrete subject responsible for oneself and for the Other. So to give a general outline of our thesis, we need to summarize it in detail. Our thesis is made up of three parts: the first is entitled "Criticism as a method in Levinas", the second "Levinas and the phenomenology of Husserl", the third and last "On the role of self-consciousness in subjectivity of the subject". The challenge of our first part is to shed light on the Levinassian method in his first "pre-war" writings, such as Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l'Hitlérisme, La compréhension de la spiritualité dans la culture française et allemande, "L'actualité de Maïmonide" and in particular De l'évasion. One carries out a parallel reading of these writings of Levinas with the "Preface" of the Critique de la raison pure (1781) of Kant. Thus, we try to show that the Levinassian method is based on the Kantian critical method. To prove our hypothesis, we claim that Kant's critical method has a triple perspective: denaturalization, non-exclusivity and the end as an unfinished system. After having underlined this methodological proximity of Levinas and Kant, we focus on the question of consciousness, always remaining within the framework of Levinas's early writings, especially in De l'évasion. In this second moment of Part One, we aim to establish that consciousness is always preceded by existence in Levinas. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we go through the Levinassian reading of Louis Lavalle's La Présence totale, according to which the presence of being is announced in the fact of consciousness. Levinas interprets it by the event of shame, for shame is par excellence the feeling of the brutality of the being which weighs on the shoulders of the ego. And by that, we see that Levinas develops one of his main notions "chaining to being". Consequently, it turns out that the subject finds itself chained in being and in its body, and that Levinas does not consider the subjectivity of the subject and consciousness without their relation or their chaining to being. In the second part of our thesis, we seek to shed light on the close relationship of Levinas's philosophy with Husserl's phenomenology as it is outlined in Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, and "L'œuvre de M. E. Husserl". Our main objective is to discover, on the one hand, how Levinas appropriates Husserl's philosophy, and on the other, to grasp the starting point of Levinas's critiques of the theory of knowledge. In doing so, we also find the opportunity to shed light on Levinas's philosophical method, which can be described as follows: Levinas always has a tendency to push any philosophy from which he is most inspired, "beyond" (au-delà) the limits of its literal meaning, in order to grasp its inner core. In the Levinassian reading of Husserl, we focus on the interpretation of Husserl's notion of intentionality. We realize that Levinas is critiquing the empire of theory over complex acts, and that he is looking for a way to break this privilege conferred on theory. This analysis, in turn, will provide an argument that is central to this thesis: consciousness does not turn towards the world by an objectifying act, by a visée de…, but by intentional feelings. This study leads to three observations. First, Levinas criticizes the exaltation of theory and intellectualism for despising feelings and affections. Second, we notice that from the start of his philosophical journey, even in his readings of Husserl, Levinas' problematic does not change, since he continues to pursue the possibility of philosophizing "beyond". We can see that this research by Levinas is nourished by two sources: critical and phenomenological philosophy. Thirdly, we try to underline the Levinassian reflection on subjectivity and its motivation to think about a subject in its relation to the world, as well as its ambition to find another path that leads towards a phenomenology of concreteness in which it is the life lived and not the theoretical life which is primordial. In the third and last part of our thesis, the role of which is fundamental for this work, our objective is to bring out the features of the theory of knowledge and of the knowing subject in Levinas. To do this, we study the "post-war" writings of Levinas, and we take a closer look at the fundamental notions of this period of Levinas's writing, such as the event of jouissance, of the il y a, of desire, of the laziness, fatigue, insomnia, light, and hypostasis. From these analyses, we show that enjoyment is the condition of the possibility of the separation of the ego from being, and thus also of knowledge. Without a felt desire for the world, the ego would never have been able to separate itself from the anonymity of the il y a, and therefore to set in motion a hypostasis. However, Levinas does not think of the subject starting from an élan vital, on the contrary he tries to reconstruct the subject starting from an event of laziness and fatigue as the main attitude of the ego in regards to being. The particular being (l'étant) withdraws and comes back on itself so as not to submit to the empire of being itself (l'être). It is therefore a question of hesitation to take responsibility before one's existence. We can see that Levinas declares a break with the Western philosophical tradition by placing at the heart of the subject a withdrawal from being and thus a certain passivity. To approach the understanding of the theory of knowledge and of the knowing subject in Levinas, we propose to analyze the concept of light. From this point of view, the consciousness which withdraws towards itself, takes, in fact, a certain distance in relation to things and to the world. This distance, this quant à soi is created by means of what Levinas calls "light". This concept signifies the principle of knowledge, that is, the power to make the other one's own, without allowing oneself to be affected by him. By analyzing this aspect, we understand that freedom is only possible in this place of distance, in that quant à soi. However, as soon as it appears, it manifests itself as responsibility – a specific responsibility towards one's body. Finally, we bring to light that in Levinas the knowing subject is defined on the basis of responsibility and not on the basis of freedom. To finish this last part, we examine whether Kant's transcendental subject comes close to that of Levinas. In order to answer this question, we go through the meaning of the transcendental in Kant and in Levinas. We deduce from this that Levinas leads the Kantian transcendental movement "beyond" its limits. It consolidates the transcendental subject from ethical responsibility while remaining outside ontology. We thus open a new path for the theory of knowledge by showing that the justification of knowledge in fact conceals a problem of justice in relation to the object. This movement of justification is a permanent responsibility of the knowing subject. At the end of this inquiry it turns out that, unlike Kant, Levinas posits the Other as a condition of the subject's possibility, a condition which also leads him to place ethical responsibility as the foundation of that of epistemology. Levinas has affirmed from the beginning of his philosophical journey that the critique of practical reason must precede that of speculative reason. By following this deeply Kantian idea, he gives primacy to ethics and poses it as a condition of epistemology. However, the big difference between the two thinkers lies in the fact that Levinas overturns the autonomy of the subject through the idea of the Other. But it is precisely due to this upheaval that he can make this singular contribution to Kant's transcendental philosophy: the Other is an exception in the system of being, he comes from "outside-being" (hors-être), and only an encounter with the Other leads the subject to this "outside-being" or to the ethical order. Thus, ruining the principle of the unconditioned condition on which the transcendental subject rests, Levinas can reinforce the transcendent subject as an "outside-being". He succeeds in saving a certain privilege of the subject, by replacing his epistemological privilege by the ethical subject.
Hegel ve Husserl'de başkası sorunu: Köle Efendi diyalektiği ile Beşinci Meditasyon'un karşılaştırması
The consideration of the problem of otherness in Hegel and Husserl, treated in the section « Lordship and Bondage » by the former and in the « Fifth Meditation » by the latter, displays a similarity. In both these texts we encounter a problematisation of the other as another ?I?. However this similarity that we believe seeing is generally ignored by the commentators as well as Husserl himself. The present project aims therefore, not only to make a comparison between these two texts but also to show the conditions of possibility of a common ground between these two thinkers. In order to prepare our arguments for such a comparison, we will first examine the idea of otherness in these two philosophers separately. On the other hand, the comparison of Hegel and Husserl that will be attempted here focuses on the problem of the other under two aspects: the contribution of the experience of the other to the subject and the inter-subjective nature of the subjectivity.
Descartes ve Heidegger'de duygulanimsallik
The main problematic of this work is the affectivity which is a philosophical question in the all history of the philosophy. Especially, in that thesis the conception of the affectivity is analyzed in the Cartesian philosophy and in the philosophy of Heidegger. That is to say that this work aims at examining the question of the affectivity as from two philosophical traditions, namely, the modern philosophy and the philosophy of Heidegger.
Martin Heidegger'in düşüncesinde özgürlük
The reformulation of the question of Being in the question of the freedom seems to constitute a decisive step in the heideggerian investigations to radicalize traditional ontology and theology. In this thesis, we tried to highlight the reason for which Heidegger initiates an investigation of large scale on the question of the freedom after the publication of Being and Time. We intended also to discuss the difficulties rising of the interpretations of Heidegger. We tried to formulate and elaborate progressively two theses in the spot of objections that Heidegger addresses to the Critique of Kant and to the schellingian theology of the freedom. Our first thesis is that the heideggerian radicalization of Kantian freedom conception developed in the framework of a metaphysics of Dasein, does not allow to the discovery of a philosophical context from where a more original problematic of freedom could be formulated and the heideggerian questioning is nothing but a repetition of it and a remarkable application example for elaborating a question, non Kantian to namely the question of meaning of Being. Our second thesis is that from the thesis of ontological difference and the cost of forgetting the schellingian concept of absolute, heideggerian questioning could only develop a secularized variant of theological dialectics of Schelling. The being (Sein) melted in the freedom, in the foundation ground, in abyss manifests itself through what it renders itself possible, that is to say through being (Seiende).In order to justify these two theses, we tried to show that Heidegger was aware of the need to radicalize the ontological questions developed in its initial work to overcome the shortcomings and the problems of modern metaphysics. We have observed that Heidegger considers necessary to return to Kant to lead a discussion on the possibility of a more radical concept of freedom since he establishes at the end of a long and thorough work of interpretation that the Schellingian conception of freedom explained by the idea of autonomy is simply a justification of the principle of the Kantian doctrine of freedom. Having identified main objections addressed by Heidegger to the Kantian and schellingian conceptions of freedom, we have endeavored to demonstrate that the concept of transcendence is the central concept of heideggerian radicalization and the Heideggerian concept of transcendence could not reshape the Kantian concept in a radical perspective.We concluded that it is not enough to presume simply a difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiende) and the abyss as the basis for this difference to be able to proceed with the radicalization of metaphysics. It appears also necessary to question not the terms of the difference but precisely the difference as such with all its aspects. The question of difference is promising a genuine revolution in philosophical thought that is expected since its first inception. In our opinion, it is even during formulation of the question of the difference that we could finally project on the possibilities unexplored so far and unexploited of our existence, and achieve thus a metamorphosis in our Dasein and finally become truly free.
Hegel'in Tinin Görüngübilimi'nde arzu ve tanıma kavramları
According to Hegel Ego cannot exist as an abstract substance independent of the world. It becomes what it is through its relation to the other, to the world. Hegel thinks of the Ego as something that can be itself only through mediation with another which is different than itself. The voyage that is told in the Phenomenology of Spirit is the voyage of consciousness? becoming substance. In Hegel?s system nothing can declare its existence without mediation. For, totality is not a totality that is constituted of the parts, rather it is the totality of the relations between the parts. Each part has a representation of the totality; totality shows its different aspects in each of these parts. Desire and recognition are important concepts since they are the mediation of relations which are necessary for the emergence of this totality. They are types of relations that are the mediation of the self-certainty of consciousness, thus they are the conditions of consciousness? being a self-consciousness. In this thesis the conditions of the transition from desire to the desire of recognition in hegelian system is discussed.
Joseph Conrad'ın Karanlığın Yüreği kitabında kimlik sorunsalı
In the centre of Joseph Conrad?s Heart of Darkness there is a voyage. The quest of the protagonist, that is to say, of Marlow?s, who is also in the position of the narrator, sets the limits of this voyage. And the main point here is a quest of truth. Therefore while Marlow interrogate his own identity the fact that the social identities contradict with the manner of being of the body in the world and that the individuals are only to be classified as the subjects with pathologic bodies of the already defined experiences as long as the body is treated like an object to be categorized and defined will come to light. This, in turn, will bring about inevitably the critiques on the definitions of the black man and the standard woman as well.
Hegel felsefesinde gerçeklik kavramı ?realitat?dan ?wirklichkeit?a geçiş
In this work in question, the shift from Realität to Wirklichkeit in Hegelian philosophy is analyzed as aufhebung in a way to come up with the real Substance of the Geist. Realität being the realm of things and finitude at the level of `being? is that which corresponds to Nature. The supersession of the Nature represents its incorporation within the general Hegelian system as a realm having a lower degree of truth when compared to Wirklichkeit which represents the realm of intersubjectivity constituted by the dialectics of action. Therefore; Nature as the realm of the finite relations among things represents the Concept positing itself as immediacy. Affirming that immediacy is a term that is also interchangeably used by Hegel to define what is abstract, one-sided and simple, we will defend that the Nature is the immediate objectification of the Concept as finitude and contingency. However, only through the negation and preservation of this immediacy ?as the term aufhebung implies- it is possible to rise up to a higher truth. Therefore; the real substance of the Geist is not Realität defined as the realm of finite relations of things but Wirklichkeit, the realm of intersubjectivity created by the dialectics of action. As part of the dialectics of action which is equal to the dynamic movement of negativity, all the finite parts involved in the act such as the work achieved, the individuals as the perpetrators of the act in question with all their inclinations and motivations are superseded. As such; this passage represents a shift from the theory of things at the level of being to a theory of action. Throughout the thesis, we will illustrate different moments of the rigorous attempt to supersede the exteriorization of the Spirit in the form of being; that is, at the level of things. This attempt, however, will only be thoroughly achieved at the dialectics of action. The actions operating as negativity proves to be the real category uniting an-sich-sein and für-sich-sein of the Concept. It is also significant here to note that the real category; that which unites thought and being; is negativity itself which shows itself in the dialectics of the action. The common interest of many individuals, the common issues that which calls them to act, the heart of the matter (sache selbst) as Hegel calls it, is therefore the true Substance of the Spirit.The shift from Realität to Wirklichkeit will be discussed in the 5th Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The chapter called the Reason (Vernunft) is basically on the movement of consciousness training itself to rise up to the level of Reason from the level of understanding (Verstand). The understanding (Verstand) is representative thought indicating the thought of an other exterior to the Subject. Therefore; it stems from the insurmountable separation between the Subject and the Object. Taking Realität as the main realm in consideration imprisons us to representational thought. Thinking at the level of things almost already implies the trust upon some sort of immediacy. Grounding our conceptualizations on a given immediacy in turn masks the fact that immediacy is already posited by the Concept as its immediate objectification. Therefore; the chapter in question illustrates the moments of consciousness attempting to free itself from the level of things based on this trust upon immediacy.This chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit is also significant in the sense that it refers to the moment of idealism. Superseding the division of the Subject andthe Object is indeed an idealistic question. In Hegelian philosophy, the Concept is the Subject that is identical to the Substance through its dialectical movement of auto-determination. The concept, in its immediate objectification, poses itself as immediacy, finitude, contingency in the realm of Realität which is alien to the Concept as its negation. Realität is therefore meant to be superseded as part of the auto-determination of the Concept.We will also refer to the Science of Logic in order to reinforce the argument. Indeed, the discussion on finitude and infinity in the first part of the work in question called ?Being? has great implications for our general purpose, since it indicates how the finite things are established as well as the possibility of their supersession. The distinction of Hegel between the limit (Grenze) and limitation (Schranke) will be, in this respect, instrumental throughout the work. The finite things for Hegel are determined in a way to limit each other; therefore one finite thing is limited by another finite thing ad infinitum. This determination constitutes the realm of finite things, Realität. However, this is not the sole determination. Each determinate quality has its own limitation which is not yet another thing but the possibility of its own supersession in relation to infinity. Therefore; from the very beginning qualities are constituted as finite things bearing the possibility of their supersession within themselves. All finite things are posited with the possibility of the supersession of their finitude. That?s the motor of the various degrees of reality in Hegelian philosophy. The supersession of Realität therefore has similar dynamics as the supersession of finite things. It is closely related to the supersession of finitude in favor of infinity.The objective of the thesis in question is to explicate the movement from Realität to Wirklichkeit as the dialectical supersession of the realm of things. In doing this, it is also aimed to underline that the Concept exteriorizes itself only immediately in the realm of things; Nature. The Concept sinks to the level of Being and thus loses its conceptual and qualitative characteristics in Nature. Therefore; the Concept cannot reside in the Nature. However, this is a necessary moment in the auto-determination of the concept. Only through the negation of this immediacy and finitude, the consciusness can rise to the level of Reason on one hand and the Concept can return to itself; related back to its own limitation and turns into Substance; which is the intersubjectivity created by the dialectics of the action. The ultimate objective is therefore to explicate the idealist attempt of Hegel to establish the identity between the Subject and the Substance.We have, in this respect, decided to achieve this objective inherent in Hegelian idealism from the point of view of the movement of consciousness that raises itself to the level of Reason (Vernunft). We believe the respective chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit lies at the heart of the work with significant implications to Hegelian idealism. The relatively comprehensive exposition of the chapter seems to prove this. It is the chapter in which consciousness becomes the singular individual in relation to the objective world. The chapter reflects the tension of the individual consciousness in appropriating the objective world which is achieved at the end of the part on the observing reason. It is interesting to see, in this respect, that the preceding parts of the work in question including sense certainty, perception, understanding and self-consciousness are once more treated in the part called observing reason. It is as if the real experience of the consciousness commences only when the individuality is constituted once the self-consciousness has the certainty that it is all reality. With Fredrick Jameson , it seems plausible to defend that the previous chapters of the work in question are only isolated episodes of this and that part of the human experience having a significant place in the history of philosophy. Only when the self-consciousness questions outside reality and attains the certitude that there is nothing there to be found except itself, can we mention the experience of consciousness in its proper sense.However, tracing the identity of the Subject and the Substance which is ultimately a question related to the auto-determination of the Concept in the movement of the consciousness inevitably brings forth some methodological questions. It requires an approach to work with the different perspectives of Logic which is the exposition of the auto-determination of the Concept and the Phenomenology of Spirit which signifies the attempt of the consciousness to attain to that truth behind this auto-determination which constitutes the identity of the Subject and the Substance in general and the consciousness and its object specifically. We adopt the idea that both works are supplementary to each other. Phenomenology of Spirit will be the main resource of the thesis, while we are going to apply to the Logic when necessary.As to the organization of the thesis, the first chapter will deal with the introduction of the 5th chapter called the Certitude and Truth of Reason. Mainly, the problem of category is sketched in this part including the response of Hegel: auto-determination of the Concept in negativity. We will explain the moment in its relation to the preceding chapters of the work. We will also deal with the above-mentioned defects of the understanding. It will be stated that the reason, in this moment, has the certainty that it is all reality. However, it is yet only an assertion waiting to be fully actualized at end the moment of the reason once the action is comprehended as the real category between thought and being.The second chapter will be on the aforementioned discussions in the Science of Logic that deals with the determination of qualities as finite things; finitude and infinity. The dialectics at play in the constitution of finite things will also be at play in the dialectics that mark the shift from the realm of things to the realm of inter-subjectivity. In this part of the Logic of Being, Hegel proposes that qualities (determinate being) are determined both through other determination and self-determination. The first constitutes their relation to each other which constitutes their finitude while the other is their relation to infinity. Through their relation to infinity, they can be for-themselves. This process is defined by Hegel as the beginning of subjectivity. Therefore; the possibility of the supersession of finitude is present even at this relatively lower level of the dialectics.After seeing the dynamics behind the constitution of finite things in the second chapter, we turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit to see how perceptive consciousness whose object is the thing with various qualities conceptualises its objectification process. The objective here is to see that the perceptive consciousness is unable to establish the realm of things. Therefore; Realität cannot be determined properly by the perceptive consciousness which once more proves that it cannot be the real substance of the Spirit. This chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit on Perception is indeed the first attempt of Spirit to become Substance. Therefore; the failure proposed here is of great importance for our theme in general. The chapter in general will be a critic against the reliance upon the immediacy of sense certainty which is in parallel to the separation between the perceptive consciousness and its object.The fourth chapter will be on the part of the 5th chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit dealing with the movement of the observing reason. This part is especially important for the fact that it deals with the question of Nature. The observing reason attempting to find itself in the objective reality gradually becomes aware of the organic unity as its proper object. Grasping organic unity as a totality that preserves itself in the finite relations constituting itself, the observing reason attempts to have the truth behind the mechanical relations prevailing in this unity. Through idea of teleology, whose implications in the Science of Logic are also a part of the chapter, the observing reason cannot identify those mechanical relations with the teleological ones. However, this non-identity will prove that the conceptual and teleological relations are mainly qualitative and they lose themselves once they are translated into the quantitative ones in mechanical relations prevailing in the Nature. This will lead observing reason to return to itself in order to find the real substance of the Spirit.In the final chapter; the movement of the reason as self-consciousness will be traced until the moment when self-consciousness attains the truth behind the dialectics of action. The main theme is the attempt of reason as self-consciousness to efface all determinations of being which will only be possible through the dialectics of action. When action is comprehended as the true category, the determinations of being as the role of singular individuals and the work achieved are all cancelled out and the realm of collective concerns (sache selbst) ?the proper realm of inter-subjectivity- becomes the true Substance of the Spirit.The main result achieved as part of the research is that the supersession of the realm of things is intrinsic to the category problem; that is the unity between the consciousness and being. Such a unity can only be truly attained once the realm of being is dialectically superseded. We may propose that any kind of unity and identity in the Hegelian philosophy requires the work of negativity inherent in the dialectical movement. Therefore; the identity of being and consciousness already implies being to be superseded. The category problem is ultimately solved once it is posited as negativity. Only when the category is endowed with the dynamic character of the dialectics, can we mention the supersession of the realm of things. Through the operation of the category we can ultimately attain the real substance of the Spirit.
Hegel'in tinin görüngübiliminde erinnerung mefhumu
This thesis tries to show that any conscious experience depends on the externalizationof Erinnerung who internalizes space-time of the mind. It is through this reciprocal relationship that it becomes possible to give meaning to history, as the internalizationof the spirit and nature, as the externalization of the mind. And analysis on Erinnerung in absolute knowledge leads us to an important result: the rational truth cannot be imposed externally to consciousness; she must win it by discovering the meaning of his own development.
Derrida'da egemenlik ve hayvan sorusu
Derrida's last seminar "The Beast and the Sovereign" links two concerns of deconstructive thought. The starting point of the seminar is the question of what intertwines the history of the concept of sovereignty with that of a thinking and treatment of so-called animal life. Derrida aims to explore the "logics" behind the submission of the beast to political sovereignty, as well as the analogy between the two that one so often comes across in political theory and discourse. What guides the seminar through though, between "the beast and the sovereign" - and my focus will be on these threads - are the larger questions of "propers of man," the supposed limits between man and what he calls the animal, the relation between the law and the living being, and the necessity of thinking responsibility in a new way, through a rethinking of "life." We will come to see that, between "the beast and the sovereign," the questions of animality and of sovereignty are inseparably bound. The analogy between the beast and the sovereign traverses the whole history of thinking of the political in the West. Throughout the seminar, we come to see that the relation of resemblance between the two does not call for identity but for an undecidable difference and serves both for positioning sovereignty outside of law and deconstructing its supposed indivisibility. The related question to the one of analogy will be about the figuration of man as "political animal" or "political living being" (politikon zoon), a figuration that has survived throughout centuries of thought to show itself once again in the contemporary discussions. Derrida's former concern about the complexities of the question of animality and sovereignty is also about the reexamination of this definition, so is his later polemics with Agamben. The coupling of the beast and the sovereign is in fact an echo of many other couples, like man and animal, politics and life, Law and outlaw, force and right, reaction and response, life and death. And it is deconstruction's call and a call for deconstruction for all the other couples in Western philosophy that is to be problematized, and that deconstruct themselves on the way to a new thinking, and to another ethics and politics, thus another thinking of freedom and responsibility. Sovereignty is the arbitrary and violent positing of power as right; the very problem of sovereignty is this problem of the relation between force and right. Derrida tells us that sovereignty has always been assumed and posited as indivisible. It is this supposed indivisibility that makes it an absolute. But it is also acknowledged, at least in accounts of political sovereignty, that sovereignty is not natural. If sovereignty is thus posited and not a natural given, this means it has a fictional structure. As such, sovereignty in the traditional sense cannot be the absolute that it was taken to be; instead, the concept of an indivisible, supreme, absolute sovereignty has always been some sort of fiction. So there is no sovereignty, but only the effect of sovereignty as a phantasm. the task will be to problematize the figure of the threshold in problematizing the Law itself, as "proper to man," and also its separation from its other, physis or "natural life." The whole seminar, circulating around the complex linkage between the question of animality and the sovereignty, thus the politicity of man, was also taking as its task a reelaboration of the relation between the Law and life, the Law and the living being. It is in this context that Derrida tackles with Agamben's discourse in Homo Sacer in the twelfth session of the seminar, where the question will be of the division of Law and life as well as the internal division in the notion of life itself, bios and zoē. Derrida returns to Aristotle's Politics in order to examine the definition of man as politikon zōon within its textual context and from this point his explicit criticism of Agamben unfolds. Derrida's critique is threefold: one, it takes issue with the zoē/bios distinction; two, Agamben's interpretation of modernity and the biopolitical, and, three, Agamben's conceptual tool of "bare life". All three criticisms are intertwined and they derive from a more profound problem Derrida identifies in Agamben's philosophizing. Agamben's proposed resolution to the fracture between bios and zoē that characterizes Western politics is conceptualized as "form-of-life," "a bios that is only its own zoē," a life that cannot be separated from its form. What Derrida has demonstrated, if not stated explicitly, is that man as a political being, in his politicity, always already, by his nature, has a life which can be described as a bios that is only its own zoē. Perhaps it is better to say that the bios/zoē distinction itself has been rendered inoperative with Derrida's attestation that man as a living being has the form "political" essentially. Derrida aims to make it possible to think about the relation between politics and life, power and living, sovereignty and biopolitics in other ways, not constraining the analysis to a single figure of explanation. The relation between politics and the living remains to be thought on a new terrain which is not marked with the severe distinction between sovereignty and "bare life," a terrain that is open to the immanent articulations of different forms of life and sovereignty. Thought can access this terrain through deconstructing a pure concept of sovereignty that presupposes indivisibility, namely, the metaphysics of sovereignty. From the question of sovereignty, we have come to that of responsibility and realized that a rethinking of responsibility entailed a rethinking of life. The relation between life and power brought us back to politics and the propers of man, which redirected us to the question of the animal. The questions of sovereignty and animality inevitably call each other, as they share the axes of ethics and politics upon which the questions of the propers of man take place. So the final question is, how are we to think ethics and politics anew, taking as a lead what the analysis had put forward? It is clear that the questions of sovereignty and animality have to be taken together, because the notions of freedom, decision, power and responsibility conjoin at their points of intersection. But it is also because a rethinking of life passes through this intersection point. The question of the animal is in fact an aspect of the more encompassing question of life, the living in life. What we take to be 'animal life' in difference from the so-called human is in fact and already "a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living," or better, "a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead." Derrida tries to track/trace the line of a thinking of life that xiii is not only limited to 'the animal,' but one that incorporates the questioning of all the concepts that are affiliated with the living, and then extending the question to the non-living. The concept of autoimmunity makes it possible to rethink the notion of life before any opposition between life and its others. The autos is autoimmune, but moreover, life autoimmunizes itself, it admits non-life, in order to live on, to survive. Another thought of ethics and politics has to go through the thinking of the unconditional without sovereignty, of the event as im-possibility and life as survival