A phenomenological approach on consciousness: Merleau-Ponty

Undoubtedly, the most important problem of contemporary debates is about what consciousness is. The problem of consciousness is a structure that is frequently addressed both in the field of philosophy of mind and in the field of cognitive sciences and is tried to be explained through various studies. Despite the studies and research, there is still no consensus on what exactly consciousness is. The lack of consensus does not mean that our knowledge of consciousness is sterile. It only shows that consciousness is explained in different structures with the unique approach of each field of study. The problem of consciousness comes to the present day through a very old thought process. This problem can be systematically considered as the contemporary version of the problem posed by mind-body dualism. This is since explanations of consciousness are either handled with a reductionist structure or the nature of consciousness is not fully understood. In this context, explanations of consciousness are generally treated as if they refer to a single structure instead of being seen as a structure of the living organism. It is precisely at this point that we come across whether there is a new approach to consciousness with the 20th century phenomenological tradition. We can say that a new approach emerged half a century ago, especially with the explanations of Merleau-Ponty, one of the important names of the phenomenological tradition, about consciousness, the body and the world. Therefore, in this study, we have tried to put forward Merleau-Ponty's views on the explanation of consciousness in the context of subject, body and world in the case of living beings. Moreover, we have tried to show what the effects of Merleau-Ponty's views on contemporary mind studies are and that the structure of subject, body and world can be handled in a holistic interaction in terms of the basic structure of consciousness.