Borç yeniden yapılandırılması teklifinde bilgi ve verimlilik

The present study analyzes the importance of information in the debt restructuring offer game played between the debtor and her creditors in the presence of the default risk of the debtor. We model it in resemblance with the tender offer game as a two-stage game, with the debtor making an offer in the first round and the creditors choosing to accept or to reject the offer, in the second. A successful (partial) debt restructuring is the efficient outcome of such a game; thereby we examine how private information affects the success of the offer. We first analyze the perfect information case, and then allow creditors to have some private information about the outcome of the game. As well as in the tender offer, ability of the debtor to make her creditors pivotal is crucial to overcome the free-rider problem between the creditors, thus making a successful offer possible. In the perfect information case debt restructuring is always successful and the optimal offer that the debtor can make is to distribute all her assets equally between all creditors. The existence of private information reduces the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome: the Debtor cannot make creditors pivotal to the success of the offer and the probability of a successful debt restructuring is always bounded away from one, because of the free-rider problem. When the loss of default is low, it is optimal for the Debtor to make a minimal (zero) offer and to default. When the loss is high, it may be optimal to ensure a positive probability of successful debt restructuring by offering a non-zero offer.