G.E.M. Anscombe's moral philosophy: The constitution of moral action

This study deals with Anscombe's moral philosophy, and examines his observations, criticisms, and recommendations on existing moral theories. In his 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy", which is considered to be his main work in the field of moral philosophy, Anscombe argues that moral theories that break away from the ancient tradition cannot cope with the problems of the modern age and puts forward three main theses: It is necessary to proceed through the philosophy of psychology in the field of morality; the issue of moral obligation cannot be resolved with concepts such as "duty", "ought", "right" and "wrong"; there is no difference between philosophers who evaluate moral action only according to its consequences. In the first chapter, Anscombe's thesis that "it is necessary to proceed through the philosophy of psychology in the field of ethics" has been presented. In this context, Anscombe's philosophy of action centered on the concept of intention has discussed and the concepts of action, self, first person, practical knowledge, practical reason, and practical inference that describe this understanding have been explained. In the second part, the implications of Anscombe's other two theses, namely, the question of moral obligation cannot be settled by concepts such as "duty", "ought", "right" and "wrong", and there is no difference between philosophers who evaluate moral action only in terms of its consequences, have been discussed. Thus, the connections of these claims with ancient and modern moral theories, the meaning of "consequentialism" and ultimately what should be understood from all these terms have been emphasized. In conclusion, according to Anscombe, a functional moral theory that can respond to the problems of our age can only be accessed through psychology. Moreover, the problem of morality cannot be solved with concepts such as duty, law, and ought, which are the remnants of our ancient conception of morality, because they cannot respond to the problems of the modern era. Philosophers or theories that judge moral action based solely on its consequences have failed to clarify the issue of moral responsibility by distinguishing between the intended and foreseen consequences of action.