The conceptual and institutional relationship between the normative interest and logical/methodological assumptions of Max Weber's social science

Although social sciences aim to produce empirical knowledge about human life, their interests have normative extensions. When they are aware of the normative conditions of their own practices, they take on a critical appearance; when these conditions remain implicit, they become instruments of economic or political interests. In this study, we will reveal the normative elements in the logical and methodological principles of social sciences in Max Weber's conception of social science as set out in his methodological texts. Since Weber's conception of social science is framed in terms of value-independence, we will first focus on the practical nature of the relationship between science and values. Then, we will examine the role of values in the value-relationship, which is the logical condition of social sciences, and in ideal-types, which are its methodological tools. Finally, we will show the place of scientific "ways of thinking" in the habitus of the ideal politician as laid out by Weber in his political ethics. Thus, we will show how science and values cooperate in the practice, logic and methodology of the social sciences and political ethics, even though they are separate fields. On the other hand, this relationship at different levels of Weber's thought is conditioned by social and academic developments in Germany. In each chapter, therefore, we will describe the matrix of problems posed to Weber by the conditions of social differentiation and academic consensus in Germany at the end of the 19th century. Thus, we will reveal the structure of the connection between the logical and methodological principles and the normative content of Weber's conception of social science, not only at the level of theory but also in terms of institutional context.