The role of memory in the identity in time: Descartes and Bergson

In this thesis, based on the hypothesis that the I without memory is impossible, the thesis that memory is the only criterion for the identity of the I in time will be defended. In this thesis, based on the hypothesis that the I without memory is impossible, the thesis that memory is the only criterion for the identity of the I in time will be defended. The impossibility of the memoryless I will be justified with the argument of time. In the discussion to be made for this, some foundations will be developed by visiting two philosophers, Descartes and Bergson. First of all, for the identity of the I/self in time in Descartes, the term I will be defined and a discussion will be made within the framework of the distinction, unity and interaction of mind and body. Secondly, in the discussion on Descartes' theory of time, dual time terms will be discussed and the term "time in thought" will be derived. It will be argued that this identity should be based on the assumption that it is possible through the innate memory developed in accordance with Descartes' understanding of interrupted time. In this direction, thirdly, a comprehensive discussion on Descartes' concept of memory will be made, as a result of which three concepts of memory will be clarified: sensory, procedural and intellectual. Based on this, it will be argued that Descartes needs innate memory. In this direction, the term "innate memory" will be derived in relation to Descartes' cogito. The possibility of this memory will be based on his theory of innate ideas and the idea of time. Finally, it will be shown that the thinking-self is identical to itself with the derived criterion of innate memory. Thus, it will be justified that innate memory is a criterion of the thinking I's identity in time. Secondly, after a discussion on Bergson's terms uninterrupted duration and memory, it will be argued that the identity of his living I in its duration is ensured by the criterion of memory that collects its duration. Thus, it will be shown that memory, which derives from both Descartes' and Bergson's conceptions of time, can be a criterion for the identity of the I in time. Thirdly, based on the identity of the I provided in terms of the strings of these two philosophers, an argumentation of identity will be established on the grounds that memory is a necessary term for the existence of the I. In this direction, the term "innate memory" will be derived in relation to Descartes' cogito.The possibility of this memory will be based on his theory of innate ideas and the idea of time.Finally, it will be shown that the thinking-self is identical to itself with the derived criterion of innate memory.Thus, it will be justified that innate memory is a criterion of the thinking I's identity in time. Secondly, after a discussion on Bergson's terms uninterrupted duration and memory, it will be argued that the identity of his living I in its duration is ensured by the criterion of memory that collects its duration. Thus, it will be shown that memory, which derives from both Descartes' and Bergson's conceptions of time, can be a criterion for the identity of the I in time. Thirdly, based on the identity of the I provided in terms of the strings of these two philosophers, an argumentation of identity will be established on the grounds that memory is a necessary term for the existence of the I. Key Concepts: Self, Memory, Descartes, Bergson and Identity.