An interpretation of Godel's incompleteness theorem based on Kant's understanding of judgement and implications regarding basis of analytical proposition

It is widely believed that Kant's elimination of metaphysics project is taken one step further by semantic tradition, by subtracting all metaphysics from the ground of philosophy, and proving the propositions of mathematics in a formal system. Firstly Frege developed the project of reducing arithmetic to logic, and in this context, developed the idea that an objective semantics could be established by the logical analysis of language. If the arithmetic can be reduced to logic, the analytic statements will be also demonstrated by the rules of logic. In other words, unlike what Kant claims, the determination of analytic propositions will be excluded from the basis of the synthesis. This form of thinking, which Frege laid the foundations of, basically applies Kant's destruction of classical metaphysics to Kant's own metaphysics. With this step, Frege and the semantic tradition thought that they, excluding metaphysics from thought, could solve all the ambiguities. Similarly Hilbert is interested in the possibility of proving the true mathematical propositions. In other words. Hilbert's aim is to secure mathematical proof. Although the starting point of Hilbert's aim is to Frege's project of reducing mathematics to logic, the difference of his project from Frege is not the attempt to reduce mathematics to logic, but the attempt to base mathematics in a symbolic axiomatic system. In this formalization, it requires that the expressions in the system should be cleared of. In other words, signs and phrases in the system will come together under the rules, which is the establishment of syntax. Given this philosophical basis of semantic tradition, it needs to be asnwered the questions like these; "can everything be proved in a logical system or is there a difference between truth and provability in a formal system?" When Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken into consideration, it can be clearly seen that there is a huge unsettled difference between truth and formal provability. Two theories Gödel proved eliminate the basis of semantic tradition in this sense. In order to understand this claim, an explanation of Gödel theorems should be given. The intellectual ground which Kant has laid down in his transcendental philosophy is the intellectual basis for explaining Gödel's theorems. Since the project of the semantic tradition has ended with Gödel, the nature of analytic propositions will be rethought within the scope of this thesis based on Kant's transcendental philosophy.