The nature of the Baghdad Pact and Turkey's Middle East policy

This descriptive dissertation is an attempt to analyze the establishment and the structure of the Baghdad Pact (1955) as a Western effort to contain Soviet expansionism in the Middle East in the critical after-War years until the end of the first decade of the Cold War with careful consideration of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. As the Second World War drew to a close, Turkey's traditional security deficit from the USSR resurrected. While bipolarity was taking shape, Turkey's security considerations overlapped with those of the West. Turkey's alignment with the West was complete with NATO membership in 1952 but was conditional on her participation in Western defense schemes for the region. The subsequent Baghdad Pact was a "Northern Tier" initiative under the tutelage of the US. This research investigates the goals of the Baghdad Pact, its enlargement and its eventual collapse with a view of its weaknesses, the reasons for hostility from non-members as well as the emerging struggle for the Middle East between the superpowers. Turkey as a co-founding member of the Baghdad Pact aimed to be pro-active in the region to enhance her importance to the West. However, she in the end remained alienated in the Middle East as the Pact changed into a weapon that backfired on its own members. The USSR gained a competitive edge, penetrated deeper into the region through exploitation of "anti-imperialism" and "peaceful coexistence" and contributed to its radicalization. Western effort on the other hand was not able to respond to the rapidly changing structure of the elusive politics of the Middle East during the time frame in consideration.