The rational and epistemological foundations of ḥadīth criticism: Comparing the traditional method of ḥadīth criticism and the epistemology of testimony

The field of ḥadīth studies constitutes the largest and most robust library ever focused on the transmission and epistemic evaluation of statements (akhbār). The traditional critical method (manhaj al-naqd) of ḥadīth scholars has been used historically and continues to be used to this day to manage, evaluate, and verify the attribution of statements to their sources. Despite the extensiveness of the field and the continued efficacy of the method, there has been little to no work done to investigate the traditional method as an epistemic system. This dissertation aims to fill that lacuna by investigating the rational and epistemological foundations of the traditional method of ḥadīth scholars. This will be achieved by identifying the central axioms and rules (mabādiʾ wa qawāʿid) upon which the manhaj al-naqd rests. Furthermore, the traditional method of ḥadīth scholars, as well as the broader Islamic epistemic system in which it operates, will be compared and contrasted with the contemporary anglophone study of the epistemology of testimony. Bringing these two traditions together will help uncover the truly epistemic nature of the manhaj al-naqd. It will also help highlight how one might give a justificatory account of its mabādiʾ and qawāʿid. The aim of this analysis and synthesis is to represent the manhaj al-naqd in contemporary philosophical terms so that it can be better understood for what it is: an epistemic apparatus (āla maʿrifiyya) that is grounded in sound rational principles. The re-articulation of the traditional method in contemporary philosophical language will allow for a more fruitful evaluation of the manhaj al-naqd on epistemic grounds. Furthermore, this epistemic analysis will be useful for future studies comparing the traditional method to competing alternatives. Keywords: Epistemology, Ḥadīth, Islamic Philosophy, Manhaj al-Naqd, Testimony.