A treatise concerning the concept of experience of Hegel

The concept of experience occupies an important position in Hegel's system of philosophy. It refers to the movement of consciousness throughout the moments which take the consciousness to the absolute knowledge. In this sense, the concept of experience is the main component of Hegel's system which allows it to become capable of integrating the existence into the realm of knowledge. Thus, the foundation of the subject and ego is directly tied to the concept of experience. In our investigation of the concept of experience, we focus on the meaning and the transformation of it as appropriate to the transformation and the meaning of the consciousness. In this context, we claim that the concept of experience has two different meanings; one is denotational, and the other one is connotational meaning of it. The consciousness comes into appearance through the denotational, or the first, meaning, whilst the self- consciousness comes into being through the connotational, or the second, meaning of the concept of experience. What this thesis claims is obviously to manifest the results of distinction of the concept of experience in itself. In addition to this, the impact of the concept of experience on the activity of the consciousness to get to know its existence is another focal point of this thesis. As a consequence, the division of the concept of experience into two meanings has an obvious effect on the manifestation of the differentiation of Hegel's system of philosophy from other approaches, and, of the foundation of the ego and appearance of two types of subject. Keywords: consciousness; experience; Hegel; Geist; idealism; self-consciousness.