Analysis of the us's security architecture in east asia on the concept of extended deterrence: A "perfect deterrence game in the US- Japan- North Korea triangle

The study aims to analyze the success and sustainability of extended deterrence in the US-Japan-North Korea triangle. In the study conducted within the framework of the basic assumptions of the perfect deterrence theory, a tripartite deterrence model in which the role of protege is taken to account was applied. The outcome of the study is that extended general deterrence in the triangle of US-Japan-North Korea has gradually evolved into extended immediate deterrence, but immediate deterrence works successfully. The abandonment fears that Japan has experienced in the alliance as a protege have forced her to take more responsibility and play a more active role, and this active role has made Japan directly a target of North Korea. Japan's expanding role in the alliance has been the strongest side of American deterrence and increased its credibility. This study showed that the possibility of Japan's nuclearization as a protege is closely related to the success and sustainability of deterrence. Therefore, the study argues that the main reason for both the failure of general deterrence and the success of immediate deterrence is the active role of Japan in the alliance. Japan is much more than a passive object of American actions or a client state.