On Quentin Skinner's application of speech act theory as a method of intellectual history

This study analyses how J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, which treats speech as an action, provides a methodological basis for Quentin Skinner's understanding of intellectual history. Austin's distinction between constative and performative utterances leads to the claim that constatives are also performative, thereby challenging the view, prevalent from Aristotle to the present day, that only statements of fact can or should be the object of logic and philosophy. Indeed, making a statement is just one of many speech acts. The basic assumption of the theory is that every type of utterance must be evaluated in terms of its performative conditions. On the other hand, Quentin Skinner, a historian from the Cambridge School, presents his method based on the idea that texts can be interpreted in connection with the theory of speech acts as an action of the author. The aim of this method is to examine the linguistic and social context as an element that determines the meaning of the text and, within this contextual framework, to identify what distinguishes the author's text from others, i.e., what the author has done with the text. Skinner contributes to the theory from a unique perspective and also gives it a practical function. This work, which deals with these developments in a more descriptive manner, provides an interdisciplinary example of how a method of intellectual history can be developed based on a philosophical theory.