Husserlian phenomenology as a critique of empiricist methodology in history

Historians associate the discipline of history with empiricist methodology and thus positivist attitude dominates historical research. On the other hand, philosophers in the phenomenological tradition and later researches in that genre have often discussed and debated the theoretical aspect of the discipline of history from a metaphysical perspective and hence the potentials of phenomenology with regards to the epistemological dimension of history has remained unexplored. This study aims at demonstrating the scope, relevance, and potentials of phenomenological tradition with regards to the epistemological aspect of the discipline of history from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology by critiquing the dominant empiricist methodology. To investigate that, unlike previous works, this study incorporates both Comte's positivism and Mill's psychologism in its analysis and critique of empiricism. It draws on Husserl's concept of pure logic, consciousness and intentionality, and life-world from his two major works Logical Investigations and Crisis and relates with the theory and methodology of the discipline of history. The research demonstrates that empiricism limits our understanding of the historical experience and argues that phenomenology can elucidate the underlying foundations of the discipline of history and widen the scope of historical research.