Theses supervised by Prof. Dr. Melih Başaran

Hegel ve Spinoza'da yurttaşlık ve özgürlük: Pro Patria Mori kavramının eleştirisi

The definition of citizenship in different forms of government provides a framework for the perception of freedom. The fact that Hegel is in favor of constitutional monarchy, and Spinoza of democracy is an indicator that their definitions of citizenship differs. On the one hand, in Hegel, the citizen is limited to being a part of political state, a higher reality than individuals. On the other hand, in Spinoza, state is nothing but a product of the effort of citizens to persevere in their being. This thesis aims at analyzing and discussing different points of view of these philosophers about sacrificing one's life for the country and the right to live, based on their ontological systems and political philosophies.

Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinde ahlak, tanrı ve din

Our thesis aims examining the position of Kant's critical philosophy in its relation with the religion. We argue that Kant's criticism is not a categorical refutation of either natural theology or historical religion. In the first part we examine Kantian criticism of natural theology, without forgetting that it has for the purpose to designate another place for religion in its system. In the second chapter we examine the practical use of pure reason as the legitimate initiator of religion to the horizon of philosophy, appointing it as the assurance of the moral law and the guardian of hope by which man thinks himself being free of all the necessities arising from nature, and as a citizen of the intelligible world. The third part of our thesis is devoted to analyzing the position of Kant with respect to the historical religion. We explore in this chapter the fact that Kant's position is not hostile to historical religion but it is not conservative either. For him the only criterion to evaluate historical religion is the moral one and he applies this criterion to it, without paying attention to its function in the religion under consideration. By means of this last part we argue that his conception of religion is engendered from the critical philosophy in a natural but not an arbitrary way. Kant reinvents religion and attaches to it a single moral task that excludes all the other possible functions of religion.

Simondon'un ontojenetik felsefesinde bireyleşme problemi

The main objective of this thesis is to examine Simondon's theories of physical and biological individuation in a comparative way with other theories of individuation in the history of philosophy and to establish the genealogy of how this approach was addressed before Simondon. In the history of philosophy, questions and theories about the individual and his genesis go back to pre-Socratic philosophers. The question of individuation, which has been widely contemplated in ancient and medieval Greek times, has been reopened for discussion and is one of the issues that remains topical. Previously, we tried to solve this problem by thinking that there was a truth or a principle behind individuation. In this sense, the main subject of this thesis will be to re-examine the general lines and concepts of Simondon philosophy and thus try to define the power of Simondon's idea of ​​individuation and the interpretation of its existence at the same time. question of being and the new philosophical lines it opens. Before doing this, the context of the criticism brought by Simondon's philosophy to the question of being with the idea of ​​individuation will be established in order to understand the debate between the philosophy of Aristotle, this problem will be all of first elaborated (becoming, genesis and being). Thus, the context in which the idea of ​​individuation speaks and where it brings criticism will be better understood. Moreover, as it is strongly quoted, the fundamental differences between Simondon's relational ontology and Aristotelian substantialist ontology will be shown and Simondon's critique of the hylemorphist definition of being will be explained.

Deleuze'ün çokluklar teorisinde devlet

In this thesis, Deleuze's conception of the state is analyzed around the theory of multiplicities, and the theory of multiplicities is analyzed around the problem of difference that Deleuze poses from the standpoint of immanence and affirmation. Throughout this analysis, instead of showing how Deleuze's theory of multiplicities is the source of his conception of the state, or how this conception necessarily derives from the theory of multiplicities, we have preferred to analyze the theoretical-political problems that arise when being and politics are considered from the perspective of immanence and affirmation. This preference has made it necessary to go beyond Deleuze and consider both his analysis of the state and his theory of multiplicities in dialogue with the efforts of other thinkers in the same direction. In keeping with the aim of the thesis, these dialogues have been used not only to identify points of convergence and divergence between thinkers, but rather to elaborate the problems to which these points belong. Among these problems, the focus is on the question of whether displacement of transcendence by immanence and the labor of the negative by affirmation still allow for an effective critique of the state and a powerful theory of struggle against it. An exploration of the transversal connections between Deleuze's texts has lead to the conclusion that the idea of immanence does not exclude a radical critique of sovereignty, any more than affirmation, whose essence is difference, excludes the aggression and selection of difference. On the contrary, instead of grasping multiplicities from the point of view of the state, in accordance with its presuppositions and its image, we have seen that grasping the state from the point of view of multiplicities, in their terms and in their relations, offers a much more effective way of exposing the state as a structural violence.

Maurice Blanchot`da yazı deneyimi

Hölderlin'in romantik estetiği

Hölderlin?s fundamental intuition consists of the unity of poetry and philosophy. In hiswork nature is not in simple opposition to civilization, but it also characterizes totality itself.Nature ie the symbol for this totality.Hölderlin seeks the way that leads the proper, and that is also to lead us to find what isproper to us. The opposition between nature and art constitutes the thought of totality.Hölderlin reaches this thought of totality through the relation between nature and art as amedium. He replaces the idealistic conception by an intersubjective one. By this, he wishesthat man takes hold of his destiny in complete freedom. For him, ?man is a god as soon as heis a man?.Key words: return, whole, nature, man, desire for death

Hegel felsefesinde din

Hegel criticizes a contemporary attitude which supposes that the religion consists of the sentiment. And he thinks that God is Spirit who reveals himself to the Spirit itself; and the essential determination of religion is thinking. Philosophy gives its concept to the truth which religion expresses it under the form of representation. According to the philosophy of Hegel, a distance between the finite Spirit and infinite Spirit is prevailed by intern division of the Spirit. The dialectical movement of the Spirit by passing through historical religions arrives to the Christianity as a revealed religion. And the above mentioned distance is gone beyond and a reconciliation is realised. In our thesis we studied the concept of religion, its representational character, its relations between the absolute religion and historical religions (between Christianity and other religions). We also studied what kind of relation is there between the religion and the state.

Gaston Bachelard'da imgeselin gerçekliği

We will see at lenght in our quest how Gaston Bachelard studied two styles of thinking, opposite to each other yet complementary of the human mind. These are science and day-dream or concept and image. This two contrary approaches of Bachelard?s works. can be interpreted as a kind of juxtaposition Therefore, one is not superior to another, epistemology and poetics should be juxtaposed. According to Bachelard, science is sustained by imagination, but the imagination isn?t identical to the real world. However imagination opens a way to poetry and litterature.

Immanuel Kant'ın pratik felsefesinde yasa sorunu

This work, stemming from Kant?s Critique of Practical Reason, tries to discuss the question of freedom and law, and also the relations between legitimation, authority and reason. In conceptualizing the moral law, which is formulated as the realization of pure reason, lies the question of possibility of human law in the lack of theological foundation. The moral law claims itself to act as a substitute for the immediate recognition of the unconditional: the fact immediate of the moral law instead of the fact immediate of the unconditional. The moral law requieres a change in the relationship between will and authority, freedom and necessity. This work calls into question the possibility of division between politics and morality, the division of human knowledge between theoretical and practical part, the consideration of morality in terms of law, the formation of antagonism / harmony between nature and reason, the value of reason characterized in the moral law.

Hegel'de ölüm sorunu

This thesis aims to understand the Hegelian philosophy as a thought of death and sacrifice. As a dialectical discourse, the philosophy of Hegel, in general, is accepted as a philosophy of freedom or of progression. In the Hegelian philosophy, freedom is regarded as becoming in home within the alterity. For example, based on the historical philosophy of Hegel, Karl Löwith concludes that it is a thought of progression. But the problem of the language in the philosophy of Hegel can open a different dimension. In that way, the philosophy of Hegel can be read as question of death and sacrifice, rather than as question of freedom. Derrida and Agamben?s comment can lead us to that path; namely a reading of Hegel basing on death and sacrifice.

Ric?ur'de bellek ve tarih arasındaki ilişki

Ric?ur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting, investigates the problematic of how can memory and history related to each other, which both the philosophers and historians face, from the possibility of the reapropriation of the past by a memory which is both constructed and also, in time, wounded by history. Our study will focus on the possibility of reaching to the historical while preserving the fidelity to the memory. Firstly, the philosophical structure of memory and remembering will examine the abuse of personal and collective memory by various ideological and political institutions. Then, the documents and witnesses, which historian uses while considering a past event, and how these resources are handled by the historian to make a historical text, namely the representation of the historian in his text, will investigated. Lastly the ontological foundations of the relation between memory and history, which is a problematic that can neither be solved solely by the phenomenology of memory nor the epistemology of history , will be evaluated and the forgetting, which, in Ric?ur, appears as an aspect of the historical condition of human beings will be investigated. At this point the reasons of forgetting, the possible results of forgetting in personal and social means, the ?duty of memory? and the necessity of the policy of the just memory will be considered.

Derrida'nın mevcudiyet metafiziğini eleştirisi

This study aims to enlighten and analyze the critique of the metaphysics of the presence in Derrida through Husserlian phenomenology, specifically in Voice and Phenomena, one of the first major publications of Jacques Derrida. In this major work, Derrida focuses on Husserl's major book Logical Investigations.When examining our subject, in the first part we are trying to deal with Husserl's view in general at the First Logical Investigation on which Derrida's whole attempt in Voice and Phenomena is based. In the second part we are passing through the general atmosphere of Voice and Phenomena. While carrying out our study, in the first chapter of second part we are mainly focusing on the first three chapters of Voice and Phenomena. And then, in the second chapter, we are examining chapters 4 and 5. The third chapter of this part of our study corresponds to the chapters 6 and 7 of Derrida's book. And finally, withthe fourth chapter, we are finishing our study by taking into account the last six pages of Voice and Phenomena which can be seen as the concluding pages of the book. In the First Logical Investigation Husserl makes a number of preliminary distinctions. The first is between expressive and indicative signs. He says every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning,' a 'sense' that the sign expresses". Expressions are distinguished by being "meaningful signs". What they express is a meaning or sense. The case is different with indications. All sorts of things can serve as indicative signs. Although they are deliberately produced, these signs do not by themselves have meaning. Their relation is not that of expression, but rather that of one thing standing for another. Behind this there is a relation of beliefs. All indicative relations share the "common circumstance" that a belief in the existence of one thing motivates the belief in another.The motivation to proceed from one to the other is based on "association". By contrast, the relation between an expression and the sense it expresses is not a question of belief. The expression seems to point away from itself to its sense. But this pointing is not an indication.What we have here is a distinction of two types of functioning. The same sign can have both an indicative and an expressive function. In communicative speech, this double functioning is absolutely required. For Husserl, these two forms of functioning are not coextensive. Signs can function expressively without indicating anything. All expressions do not have an indicative function. But, in communicative speech they do. However, speaking with others is not our only type of discourse. We also speak to ourselves. When we do, the expressive function continues, but the indicative one disappears. Husserl says that expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life. They continue to have meanings as they had before. They do not, however, function as indications. It is not the case that in xiiisoliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, that is, as indications, of one's own inner experiences. The reason for this is that indications stand for their referents. But such standing for seems out of place when the referent itself is present. In interior monologue, then, we are in our mental life, self-present without any mediation. Husserl makes a further distinction between indication and expression. It concerns their relation to their referent. Referring in the case of indications is a matter of standing for something. This is a direct relation where the existence of one thing brings about the belief in another. By contrast, an expression's relation to its referent is mediated by its sense. The expression refers through its sense. In so doing, it has the possibility of having its reference confirmed by a direct experience of the referent. There can be a "fulfillment" of its sense in a corresponding intuition. In the second part of our investigation, firstly in the Chapter I, we are beginning Derrida's critique in Voice and Phenomena. His critique involves the concept of reduction. Husserl has the distinction between mental life as involving contingent associations, as empirical which needs to be bracketed to get at the ideal, noncontingent relations and mental life regarded genetically as the "pre-expressive, prelinguistic stratum of sense, which the reduction must sometimes disclose by excluding the stratum of language.Derrida makes the claim that the turn to solitary mental life is an implicit reduction which embodies this opposition between transcendental and empirical. For Derrida, indicative signification implies empirical existence. If expressions could not function without such signification, then the bracketing of empirical existence also brackets the functioning of expressions. What would remain after this bracketing would, then, be devoid of both language and meaning. Derrida's claim is that, in fact, the functioning of the meaning intentions that animate our speech also requiresindication. The "pre-expressive, pre-linguistic stratum of sense" that generates sense in our acts is, he claims, interwoven (Verflochten) with indication. Thus, the reduction is contradictory. In the third chapter, Derrida asserts that expression and indication cannot really be distinguished because both are externalizations. Expression is externalization that intends an outside which is that of an ideal object. Indication is also externalization even though it intends a real object. Both are voluntary: I intentionally produce the indication and the expression. Meaning is Bedeutung (wanting to say, vouloir dire).In addition, communication to the other cannot occur without indication. My words stand for my thoughts. But, as Husserl admits, "expression is 'originally framed' to serve the function of communication. As such, it requires indication since the hearer does not directly experience the inner experiences of the other. As Derrida notes, the premise here is presence. We must rely on indication because we have no primordial intuition of the presence of the other's lived experience. When, however, in solitary speech, indication disappears, we must be in the sphere of pure presence.The meaning has therefore a presence to the self in the life of a present that has not xivyet gone forth from itself into the world, space, nature. All these "going-forth" effectively exile this life of self-presence in indications. In Chapter II, our study is dealing with the chapter 4 and 5 of Voice and Phenomena. Derrida begins with the retaking of Husserl's claims about interior speech. Firstly, in inward speech, I communicate (indicate) nothing to myself. I can at most imagine myself doing this. Husserl says, but in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases. One merely imagines (man stellt sich vor) oneself as speaking and communicating. Secondly, in inward speech, I communicate (indicate) nothing to myself. Such an operation would make no sense. The existence of mental acts does not have to be indicated because it is immediately present. Also Husserl says, in monologue, words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless.Here, Derrida engages in a general argument against the distinction between expression and indication through the concepts of re-presentation(Vergegenwärtigung) and repetition. For him, re-presantation is essential to the functioning of signs. One cannot therefore eliminate it to make the distinction between expressive and indicative sign. Ideality of language, thus senses, involves repetition, re-presentation, thus indication. Ideality in the case of the sign is the result of re-presentation. Thus, the ideality of signs necessarily implies representation. The ideality of the sign, for Derrida, is constituted by this repeated act of substitution. Re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) is the "productive act" whose repetition produces ideality.In both expression and indicative communication, the difference between simple presence and repetition is exhausted. As an attack on presence, the claim is that the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse. This means that the direct presence Husserl takes as definitive of such speech cannot obtain. Such presence is negated by the absence required by the representative relation. Husserl asserts that the distinction between indication and expression shows itself in soliloquy by introducing the concept of im selben Augenblick, at the same moment, or at the same blink of eye.According to Derrida, this claim indicates that self-presence must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present in order to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs.Also since the move to soliloquy is an implicit reduction, this too fails. There is no escaping empirical contingency. Derrida says that if the present of selfpresence is not simple, if it is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is threatened in its very principle. Whole notion of knowledge has to be abandoned when we say with Derrida that ideality is constituted by a repetitive substitution. It is not the ideal content that grounds the possibility of the return, and thus of knowledge in Husserl's sense. Rather the return grounds the possibility of the ideal content. xvAccordingly, the ideal is what may be indefinitely repeated in the identity of its presence. For Derrida, to include the ideality of the sense in consciousness (to assume that we can encounter it directly in our consciousness) is to assume that presence to consciousness can be indefinitely repeated. This, however, assumes that the present or rather the presence of the living present can sustain this repeated presence. Derrida's position is that this supposed self-presence is actually the result of a repeated substitution. The presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not the reverse. Its ground is a non-presence. Its basis is the absence that allows the substitute to take the place of what it substitutes for. If presence itself involves absence, I never directly encounter the content. I only grasp it through its substitute or indicative sign. Chapter III of our study is investigating the chapter 6 and 7 of Derrida's book. Chapter 6 is about the account of the possibility of soliloquy. It is "the voice that keeps silence" that makes the illusion of solitary silent speech possible. Speech actually requires indication which requires a physical medium. The voice provides this and yet does not visually appear. As a result, the voice seems internal. It gives us the illusion of an internal self-presence. This presence of the voice to consciousness is a self-affection. Derrida asserts that the voice is that which is present to itself in the form of universality because the self-presence involves the repeated return to the same. We are present to ourselves through an ongoing process of auto-affection. Each time we access, it is through the words that the voice embodies. Since we do this again and again, the words are returned again and again. For Derrida, what constitute the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification is that its substance seems to be temporal. Such temporality seems the real basis of our auto-affection. To establish this, Derrida gives his theory of temporalization. The temporalization understood as the addition of new moments and their subsequent retention results from the selfaffection of the present. This is because underlying presence is what Derrida calls "differance." "Time," as "the 'movement' of this auto-affection" is actually "the 'movement' of this strange difference". The "strange" difference is différance, taken as the "operation of differing". This operation results in the "pure production" of the new now as well as the retention (or "retentional trace") of the now which this new now replaces. Both production and retention characterize the living present. Différance is also responsible for this present's self-presence. The living present cannot be present to itself unless it can return to itself, that is, encounter its presence in a new or retained moment. This return arises from the "operation of differing," namely, the action that introduces a "pure" difference into the now. Insofar as this produces both a new and a retained presence, this pure difference constitutes the self-presence of the living present. The term, "pure difference" thus designates the "non-identity with itself" of the living present's nowness, a non-identity that allows it to affect itself. Insofar as xvithis self-affection results in a return to presence, it permits the living present to be self-present.Difference is prior to identity. The "pure difference" inherent in each content filled now makes it affect itself. This auto-affection gives rise to the next now. Each now, thus, has its identity as a distinct now "only by becoming the other of the same." It has it by virtue of the self-affection of the same, which makes explicit the otherness, the "pure difference," inherent in the same. This also holds for the past moments given by the retentional "traces." They are also inherent in the present by virtue of the "pure difference" it embodies. This difference makes the living now affect itself with a new primordial actuality, which is a next now, a new impressional moment. Derrida, having dismissed the primordiality, cannot use it to account for succession. Its origin is, in fact, differance understood as deferring or delaying, that is, differance in the sense "of postponing till later". Differance, then, means both differing and delaying. The operation of differing both fissures and retards the presence by submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay.In chapter 7, including the last six pages, we have the claim that there is no original, what we have instead is a process of continual substitution, one where one thing substitutes for (or stands in the place of) the next. Derrida put this claim in terms of the notion of supplementation. What is supplemented is the lack of the original, the lack of its primordial presence. Its concept applies to every indicative relation. To apply this structure to temporalization is to assert that the living present is not originally present. Its continued presence is the result of a repetitive supplementation, one where supplements are repeatedly put in "in the place of" this present. Thus, the non-plenitude of presence of the living now is supplemented in the direction of the past by the retention that stands in the place of the just departed moment. Derrida's claim here is that the now can only appear through its chain of retentions. The chain, however, is a chain of substitutes, each acting to substitute for the non-presence of what it retains. If we suppose that the original appears only through the chain, we have to say, phenomenologically, that the chain is first and the original is second.Normally we would say that the original is first. It is actual. The retentions are second, they are possible only if there is an original, an original to which they are added on as its retentions. Derrida reverses this: He asserts that what we have hereis the "strange structure of the supplement". For Derrida, then, the action supplementation is actually that of différance. Différance itself involves both differing and delaying in the sense of postponing till later. This means that its operation both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay. By virtue of the first sense, presence differs from itself. It involves non-presence. Fissured by it, it only appears to disappear. By virtue of the second sense, this reappearance, understood as a supplementation, involves a delay and thus is successive. Derrida's claim is that this xviisuccessive supplementation constitutes the original, that is, the living present as the source of evidence. In chapter IV of our study, we are examining the concepts of aporia and difference through the concept of experience (épreuve). Here, Derrida claim that deconstruction is an experience (épreuve) of the difference. The experience that Derrida is trying to bring forth is an experience –'the making appear' or presence –of the irreducible void, of the difference or lack, which is original and yet not a foundation. So the experience of deconstruction must be conceived as the presence of the non-foundation.As a conclusion, Derrida wants to show that when Husserl acts simply as a phenomenologist, his analyses confirm Derrida's positions. It is only when he gives way to the prejudices of a metaphysics of presence, that he opposes these positions