Nafs al-amr in Nasiruddin Tusi's philosophy

Although the concept of Nafs al-amr is older, it is based on Nasiruddin Tusi that Nafs al-amr was brought to the agenda as an epistemological problem and that it was defined and talked about. In fact, his student Hılli clearly states in Kashf al-Murad, which he wrote as an annotation to his Tajrîd al-Itiqad, that there is no information about this issue in previous books. Tusi brought Nafs al-amr to the agenda not as a directly independent problem, but under the title of imagination of the subaltern in Tajrîd, and in the context of proof of abstract reason in Isbâtu'l-Akli'l-Mucerred Treatise. Thus, the subject of Nafs al-amr has been analyzed and discussed in depth both in the annotations of Tajrîd and in the annotations of the treatise in question. Nafs al-amr interpretations which are made in Islamic philosophy were discussed in general and it was determined which interpretations were made by which philosopher, mutakallim or mystic. In general, it has been determined that there are seven different interpretations of Nafs al-amr. The first of the seven interpretations we have identified, belongs to Tusi and it is claimed that Nafs al-amr is Active Intellect or al-Aqlu'l-kul. Since it is the main subject and problem of our thesis, we have focused on this subject extensively. Definitive provisions must have a proof outside the mind with which there is an agreement between them. Tusi called it Nafs al-amr. The accuracy of the judgment or proposition is bound to agree with what is in Nafs al-amr. This agreement, which is fixed outside the human mind, is not self-contained, but is embodied in something that is positionless. As a result of the seven premises he listed, Tusi concluded that the substance represented by this agreement, which is fixed outside the mind, is al-Aqlu'l-kul. In the dialogue between Tusi and himself in Kashf al-Murâd, Hılli reports that Tusi calls this abstract substance the Active Mind. Tusi thinks that this abstract substance cannot be Vacibu'l-wujûd. Because such presence, which is represented by the multitude, cannot be a simple Necessary Being. His contemporary Semseddin Kisi, who wrote the first commentary on Isbâtı'l-Akli'l-Mucerred with the name Ravzatu'n-Nazır, stated that al-Aklu'l-kul was famous as the First Intellect among philosophers, and because he was the first to be disabled, he was the first to be called First Mind, which did not yet include multiplicity. He argued that the mind cannot be the place where these agreements are formed and converged. However, he did not specify what it was instead. Devvani, another interpreter of the treatise, pointed out the problems at several points. Among these, the issue of how the Necessary Being knows this multiplicity formed by the formation of agreements draws attention. In order for the knowledge of the multitude not to overshadow the simplicity of the Necessary Being, the possibility has arisen that it may have arisen elsewhere, not in its own person. In this case, the problem of the obligatory's knowledge of his own disabled depends on someone else, that is, his neediness arises. In this case, Devvani argued that the thesis defended by Tusi, namely the view that the knowledge of the multitude is represented in the Active Intellect or al-Aklu'l-kul apart from the Necessary, would be unfounded. It is understood that Devvani, who pointed out the problematic points in Tusi's proof, did not go beyond the problem identification and tend to produce a solution. However, it is seen that Devvani made great contributions to the analysis of the issue. It is seen that Kashmiri, one of the commentators of the Risale, positioned himself by defending Tusi against the criticisms.