The problem of the cause of the need for an agent in late period kalām

The adoption of the theories of hudūth (ex nihilo) and imkān (possibility) in the field of kalām thought has brought along many debates. One of these discussions is the argument about the cause of need for an agent, and the continuous dependency of the effect on the agent. This debate, which we believe was systematized by Kādī Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), first emerged among the kalām scholars and was later carried into the later period by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), who, along with his critique of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) of the Mu'tazilī theologians—thereby also critiquing Kādī Abd al-Jabbār— extended the debate further. Subsequently, this issue has been discussed under the headings of hudūth and imkān in almost all theological works. The sources indicate that four primary responses have been provided to the problem about the cause of the need for a müessir (agent): (i) only imkān, (ii) only hudūth, (iii) imkān in conjunction with hudūth, and (iv) imkān conditioned by hudūth. Philosophers and most of the later kalām scholars have tended to provide only the imkān response, while those who provide the hudūth response are predominantly Mu'tazilī scholars who, following Kādī Abd al-Jabbār, adhere to the view of ma'dūm thinghood. As is well known, the Mu'tazilī scholars who adopt the view of ma'dūm thinghood maintain that entities, which are subject to God's power, must be differentiated in themselves and that the possible beings, which differentiate themselves ontologically, are real in their essence. According to these scholars, it is possible for beings in a state of non-existence to have certain attributes in a state of thubūt. Imkān, on the other hand, is a quality of the ma'dūm in the category of "thing" and is attributed to the possible being independently of the Creator. From the Mu'tazilī perspective, a possible being possessing the quality of imkān can exist in a state of thubūt without any act of creation, thus making it unnecessary to rely on any external müessir for its existence, invalidating imkān as a cause of need for a müessir (agent). The representatives of the last two views are not explicitly mentioned in the sources; however, scholars such as Ibn Ṭilimsānī (d. 658) and Alā' al-Dīn al-'Arabī (d. 901/1496) have been found to clearly advocate for these positions. Additionally, the interpretations of thinkers like Al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and Al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) suggest that they may represent the proponents of these two views.viii According to philosophers who adopt the distinction between existence and essence, imkān, in terms of being an essence, is an inseparable necessity of essence and constitutes the cause (ʿilla) of the dependence on the agent (müeesir). Philosophers who regard the union of cause and effect (illa-malul) as obligatory argue that the agent is effective not only in the possible being's coming into existence but also in its continuity in existence. Therefore, the completion of conditions for the possible being, according to the principle that the effect (malul) cannot be separated from its cause, necessitates the existence of the possible necessarily. The philosophers' assertion that the cause of need is imkān, as noted by Fakhr al-Din al-Râzî, has been defended as a theory that foresees the eternal nature of the world (kadîm) and, despite its eternal nature, still requires an agent for its continuous existence. The idea hudūth, however, is a theory that eliminates the necessary unity in the relationship between God and the world. This view has led the Sunnî theologians who consider the cause of need to be hudūth, to face the criticism of Ibn Sînâ, who stated: "They (the theologians) could claim that even if God were to cease to exist, this would not harm the existence of the world." However, earlier Sunnî theologians, who adopted that accidents are created continuously, that accidents cannot exist upon accidents, and that substance cannot be separated from accidents, should be excluded from the scope of this criticism. In contrast, Mu'tazilite thinkers such as Kādī Abd al-Jabbār and his student Ibn Mattawayh (d. mid-11th century), who argued that there is no rational evidence for the annihilation of substance and that the continuity of the creation is possible without an agent, are the subject of the aforementioned criticism. Ibn Sīnā's criticism of the theologians and his acceptance of imkān as a cause of need was largely accepted by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and his explanations and arguments on the subject profoundly influenced the way later theologians dealt with this issue. Consequently, later theologians argued that hudūth is neither the cause, nor a part of the cause, nor a condition of the cause, but rather could only be a quality of the created being. This is because hudūth is a quality that is dependent on the existence in need of creation. Subsequently, the created being itself is in need of a creator because it requires creation. Since need is dependent on the cause that necessitates need, if "hudūth" were the cause, it would have to follow itself several steps after itself. This argument, put forth by alRāzī, was frequently reiterated by later scholars. This repetition ultimately led to the principle that, when the equal possibility of existence and non-existence is considered asix the counterpart to ḥudūth, the mind clearly perceives the necessity entailed by imkān; and thus, in terms of nafs al-amr, imkān was established as the cause of need. However, unlike the philosophers, who regarded imkān as an absolute non-existence (ademī) and conceptual quality, the theologians avoided the philosophical notions of the eternity of the universe, the conception of mūjib bi'z-zāt, and necessary causality, and as a result, this distinction allowed them to deviate from the philosophers, who, like themselves, considered the cause of need as imkān. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's presentation of the views of those who regard the cause of the need for the agent as ḥudūth was criticized by some theologians who came after him. For example, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 702/1303) argued that if those who defend the idea of ḥudūth mean with cause the final cause (ghā'ī 'illāh), then Rāzī's criticisms would be invalid. Similarly, thinkers such as al-'Iji (d. 756/1355), al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1502), and Ibn Kamāl Pasha (d. 940/1534) sought to show from various perspectives that the proponents of ḥudūth did not intend to make ḥudūth itself the cause of need, in terms of nafs al-amr. Indeed, according to al-Ījī, al-Rāzī's argument is a clear fallacy (mugālatā), and according to Ibn Kamāl Pasha, the idea of ḥudūth, as presented by alRāzī, is a position that no rational person can accept. According to al-Ījī, the theologians who see ḥudūth as the cause of need mean that the intellect judges need when it considers that something exists out of nothing (hudūs). Otherwise, They do not mean that ḥudūth is the cause of need in the external world. Had they meant this, ḥudūth would occur first in the external world, and need would follow. On the other hand, Ibn Kamāl Pasha argued that to analyze the issue correctly, the cause should first be divided into two types: the cause of thubūt and the cause of isbāt, whereas Al-Dawwānī, by categorizing ḥudūth as either potential (bi'l-quwwah) or actual (bi'l-fi'l), interpreted the view that Ibn Kamāl Pasha described as the cause of thubūt similarly, equating it with actual ḥudūth (bi'l-fi'l). In this sense, he considered it unlikely that ḥudūth would be the cause of need. However, he argued that if one speaks of ḥudūth as a cause in the sense of "if something is to be, it will become a created thing (hâdis)," the objections to ḥudūth would become invalid. This way of thinking resolves the problem of ḥudūth coming after existence and preceding itself by several stages. Key Words: Imkān (Possibility), hudūth, the cause of need for an agent, ma'dūm thinghood, nafs al-amr