The criticisms of Barāhima on the contingency of prophethood and al-Bāqillānī's answers

In kalām literature, Barāhima has always been the subject of criticism against the contingency of prophethood. One of the mutakallimūn who dealt with Barāhima's criticism in detail is al-Bāqillānī. This study will examine Barāhima's objections to prophethood as they appear in al-Bāqillānī and the responses to them. Different perceptions of the identity of the Barāhima emerged in the Islamic world from the II/VII century onwards. Moreover, the criticisms attributed to them regarding the possibility of prophethood also differed. The first chapter of the thesis presents the image of the Barāhima in al-Bāqillānī. In this context, it chronologically traces the pre-Bāqillānī sources of the image of the Barāhima, who denied prophethood while believing in a wise Creator, rational obligation (taklīf) and the essential nature of good and evil. In addition, the historical identity of the objections attributed to Barāhima by the Ashʿarite mutakallim is discussed in order to complement this picture and to highlight the differences in al-Bāqillānī's reception. Against this background, the second chapter scrutinises these objections analytically within a certain framework. Accordingly, the ontological distinction between the eternal and the created and the impossibility of the prophet's knowledge of his own prophethood show that it is not contingent for God to send a messenger to humanity. Moreover, the injustice of the messenger being of the same kind as the interlocutors to whom he is addressed, and the sending of prophets to those who are known to be unbelievers from eternity, contradict the concept of a wise Creator. It is also impossible for the apostle to prove his prophethood to his interlocutors. In fact, miracles are not logically possible, proving the truth of the claim of prophethood by a miracle raises serious problems, and there is no way to distinguish a miracle from other extraordinary events. Even if these objections are ignored, the reason does not need the message brought by the prophet. The acts of worship contained in this message cannot be the commands of a wise God. In response to these criticisms, al-Bāqillānī argues that the ontological difference between the sides in the communication does not prevent communication. Moreover, a prophet can have the necessary comprehension of his prophethood through various means. The impossibility of injustice for God who is the owner of everything and the fact that prophethood is not a right but a tafaddul shows that the fact that the messenger and his interlocutors are of the same kind cannot be interpreted as injustice. However, if it is against wisdom to send messengers to those whose infidelity is known from eternity, then those who are known to reject the rational obligation should not be created. Moreover, it is rationally possible to create a miraculous event that proves the truth of the claim of prophethood, and the criteria of a miracle distinguish it from other extraordinary events. If the essential nature of good and evil is denied, it becomes clear that good and evil, which are at the centre of human life and the basis of morality and law, can only be known through prophethood. The fact that only a prophet can bring the information necessary for the survival of human beings in nature is one of the important proofs of prophethood.